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Thorsten Jelinek's avatar

Wheeler’s concept of “it from bit” offers another interesting perspective towards the discussion of consciousness. However, his concept faces a contradiction akin to the metaphor that water cannot be filtered with water. If we treat information (the “bit”) as primary—some pre-existing reality—we encounter the issue of how such information can exist without something to process or contextualize it. Wheeler acknowledged this challenge and introduced the idea of a “participatory universe”—where conscious observers or agents are essential to the existence of the physical world, or in the creation of reality through observation or measurement. However, Wheeler’s concept still encounters two major analytical problems: a) the combination problem, and b) the decomposition problem.

A) Lack of a Mechanism for Combination

The combination problem asks: how do abstract pieces of information (bits) combine into conscious entities, such as individual minds? This is the core issue in emergentism. Wheeler’s framework implies that complex arrangements of information somehow lead to consciousness, but it doesn’t specify how this transition occurs. Information processing alone doesn’t explain qualia—the subjective nature of experience. Even if we assume that bits are carriers of information (and possibly mental content), the combination problem remains: how do these individual bits of information combine to form coherent, unified minds?

B) How Does a Unified Consciousness Fragment? (Decomposition Problem)

The decomposition problem asks the reverse: If bits are the foundation of reality, and we assume that these bits can somehow give rise to observers, how do these observers experience themselves as distinct from one another? Without a mechanism for disassociation or fragmentation, Wheeler’s framework struggles to explain the existence of multiple minds rather than just one unified observer. Wheeler’s informational realism treats information as primary, but information in itself doesn’t seem capable of explaining the fragmentation of experience. Information is inherently neutral and abstract—it doesn’t inherently carry the subjective qualities that characterize distinct individual minds. The decomposition problem requires an explanation for why and how individual minds experience themselves as separate from the rest of reality.

Ultimately, the combination and decomposition problems show that Wheeler’s informational realism falls short when it comes to explaining the emergence and fragmentation of consciousness. Information, by itself, doesn’t possess the qualities necessary to explain subjective experience or the unity and separation of minds. These issues point to the need for a more consciousness-centric model of reality, where bits of information are not primary, but instead are derivatives or representations within a universal field of consciousness.

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